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Introduction 
Explaining strategic culture in respect of newly formed nation-states—still evolving and in the 
process of discovering their identity—is in itself is a challenge. Strategic culture in new states is 
affected by two factors: the regional security situation and the local political culture. In such cases, 
what might appear as “culture” could well be evolving trends within society, reactions to regional 
or local threats, and repercussions of events elsewhere. Strategic culture assumes a connotation 
of quasi permanence—a subtle attempt to identify a pattern of response or predict strategic 
responses or military behavior.  
Many new nations are yet lacking complete structures that are necessary to form a modern 
nation-state. In examining case studies such as that of Pakistan, there is a danger of reading too 
much. Developing nations have national psyches and strategic outlooks based on their historic 
experience, which might differ from the western experience. Strategic choices are often 
determined on narrow parochial interests, driven by local factors and normally in response to a 
regional-based competition, which is invariably fierce. In countries such as India and Pakistan 
dominant elites build narratives, hypothesize threat perceptions, and develop notions of war and 
peace. They create narratives and “myths to help consolidate local interests’ domestic politics, 
and organizational interests.”[1]  
Politico-military policy-makers do not necessarily make a comprehensive net assessment of 
threat based on reality, but often shape their security disposition by “their image of the 
situation.”[2] This does not imply that security policy dispositions and responses are made 
impulsively but in essence from a mix of realism, organizational dynamics, and a backdrop of a 
relatively permanent strategic culture.[3] Hasan-Askari Rizvi, a well-respected Pakistani scholar 
has defined strategic culture as “a collectivity of beliefs, norms, values and historical experiences 
of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their understanding and interpretation of security 
issues and environment, and shapes their responses to these.”[4] 
Pakistan is a young nation-state, with a still evolving concept of itself and its role in the world. In 
the world of states, it is a teenager—internally struggling with hormones, living in a bad 
neighborhood, and still in the process of developing its strategic personality. It has a well-defined 
“strategic enclave,” however, which directs the strategic dialogue in the country.[5] This group is 
dominated by the military in Pakistan, with the support of professional bureaucrats, particularly 
those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These individuals are the keepers of Pakistan’s strategic 
culture. Like most bureaucracies, they are slow to admit mistakes, resistant to alternative 
worldviews, and tend to lean on organizational preferences when faced with new situations that 
require change. These inertial forces in policy may give Pakistan a greater consistency in 
strategic thought than might be expected given its often turbulent domestic political situation. 
This paper will explain Pakistan's strategic culture by examining several factors: historical 
experiences, image of the self, images of adversaries, experience with strategic alliances, and 
the role of nuclear weapons. 
Historical Experience 
With some 150 million inhabitants, this Muslim nation has over half a million armed forces and 
possesses an unspecified but substantial number of nuclear weapons and delivery means.[6] 
Pakistan has had a checkered history of relations both with its immediate neighbors as well as 
within the state and society. Though short in history as a nation-state, it has had an extraordinary 
share of security challenges. Pakistani nationhood is evolving under the shadow of a sensitive 
geopolitical arena at the confluence of three large and relatively rich and powerful neighbors. 
China, India, and Iran have past memories of being great civilizations and hold ambitions of 
becoming great powers. Pakistan’s historic narrative is replete with a sense of wrongdoing and 
injustices, betrayals of trust and treaties, abandonment by allies, and victimization due to religion, 
race, and color. 
Domestically, it faces an identity crisis as to whether it is a homogenous Muslim state or an 
Islamic state, and faces ethnic and sectarian clashes and unsettled civil-military relations. Regular 
bouts with regional rivals on unsettled borders both to its east and west have fostered a security-
intensive environment. In short, its experiences in dealing with security threats—both external 
and internal—have lead Pakistan to become less secure, impacting both its civil society as well 
as the military. 
The ascendance of the military in Pakistan is a direct outcome of its security intensive 
environment. The Pakistan military inherited the British tradition: subservient and answerable to 
the civilian masters, while still playing a significant role in governance and security. After partition, 
unlike its neighbor India, Pakistan's political and security structures took off on quite a different 
trajectory. Save for the military, Pakistan never had robust state institutions. 
Pakistanis believe that India has never accepted the concept of Pakistan, at least not completely, 
and has sought proactively to undermine Pakistan’s security. The trauma of partition, the Jammu 
and Kashmir dispute, and the debate over distribution of assets are the main issues that pitched 
Pakistan and India onto a track of hostility and wars, and both countries have not been able to 
change course—even after nearly six decades. Afghanistan’s claims over Pakistan territory—duly 
supported by Delhi and Moscow—exacerbated Pakistan's security concern. Pakistan's 
experience with external alliances—with the United States and with China—could not redress its 
security concerns. At best, both provided some military equipment and marginal political support, 
while also enabling Pakistan to present its grievances internationally. But during times of intense 
crises, outside alliances were unable to ensure Pakistan's national security. 
Based on its historical experience over time, certain traits peculiar to the Pakistani nation are 
discernable. Pakistanis are extremely proud of their history, culture and traditions. They are 
always eager to compete with neighbors and accept challenges much greater than might be 
handled objectively. They have a belief in their own self-righteousness. Pakistanis internally have 
a penchant to confront state authority and generally distrust government. This is part of a broader 
tendency to reject or express skepticism on face-value explanations. Pakistanis are always 
searching for conspiracies. These traits, coupled with Pakistan's intrinsic national insecurity, 
entwine to form images of self and others, as is explored in the following section. 
Image of the Self 
A nation’s image of itself has a strong link to the historical experiences of the people. Like its 
neighbors in Iran and India, Pakistanis consider themselves to be second to none. These nations 
re-live there past glories, and take pride in their histories. The Muslim nation evolved over 
centuries, and carved out its distinct identity of Indian Muslims in the subcontinent. Pakistanis 
believe that they are the descendents of the Muslim rulers of the subcontinent who fought for 
(and won) an ideology entitling them to a separate homeland. At the core of Pakistani nationhood 
lies this emphasis on separateness and distinct identity—a character of the nation and especially 
of the keepers of the strategic culture in Pakistan. And Pakistani insistence of separateness is 
dismissed with equal vigor by India. The Pakistan strategic enclave has internalized this belief 
that Pakistan must be protected physically and ideologically from the more powerful influence of 
India. 
Pakistani military culture is central to understanding Pakistan's self image. The military prides 
itself as the guarantor of the state—an enduring legacy of the British times. Th e military played a 
key role in consolidating the British Empire in India and was always an equal partner. The British 
Indian civil administration depended heavily on the army in fulfilling local responsibilities and 
establishing control of the rowdy principalities, feuding princes, and hostile tribes in the frontiers. 
The Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) was second in order of precedence to the Governor 
General/Viceroy, and his role was significant—both in strategy and policy. Defense expenditure 
was the single largest item in British India, and always took away more resources than education, 
health and other needs—a pattern that continues to date in Pakistan. 
This tradition of governance—being the bulwark of the state—was strong in the congenital self-
image of the military. The British Indian Military was viewed as the guarantor of external security 
and the safeguard against the internal collapse, and this gave the military an expanded role. 
In collaboration with the senior bureaucracy, the military became a powerful actor in decision-
making within the set-up in India. [7] Immediately at independence, the regular army—still being 
divided between India and Pakistan—was simultaneously engaged in a border crisis, handling an 
influx of refugees, and otherwise dealing with the trauma of partition. The regular army could 
pride itself for its role in state-building and its aid to civil power, while simultaneously managing a 
war over Kashmir when Pakistan was barely on its feet. Since Pakistan’s birth, the security threat 
was real and imminent and thus strong defense was the foremost priority, a view equally shared 
by both military as well as civilians. [8]  
The first decade of Pakistan’s existence revealed that its political leadership showed little respect 
for democratic and parliamentary principle, norms, and conventions, which are the essence and 
foremost principle of civilian supremacy over the military. The military respects civil institutions 
when these ideals are upheld. Absent that, the polity becomes a battlefield of brute power politics, 
fragmenting political forces, and weakening civil society. And when political institutions decline it 
creates a vacuum allowing the military-bureaucratic elite to gain the upper hand, in which they 
assume the role of the savior of the state. As a professional, disciplined, and task-oriented force, 
the military brings in a semblance of order and stability to the relief of the people. In the process, 
the military discovers wrongdoings by their political masters and develops disdain for the 
politicians. This validates the self-image not just as savior, but also as the ultimate key to national 
security and the prosperity of the state. This pits it against the civilian politicians. And when the 
civil powers return, their energies are consumed in settling scores with the opposition and power-
consolidation rather than strengthening institutions. For the past five decades, Pakistan has been 
caught in this vicious cycle, which is the tragedy of Pakistani politics.[9] 
The institutional belief that the military must be well paid and well respected for its sacrifices and 
challenges is an accepted norm in most countries. Though the role of and reward to the military 
were legacies of the British times, the Pakistan military faced much stronger adversaries and 
greater structural handicaps in performance of its role. In retaining its pride and self image, the 
military blames handicaps and failures to ill luck, and is not prepared to accept that it lacked will, 
or professional competence, to face national challenges. Because of the Pakistani military’s 
frequent take-over of power, the civil politicians resent the military’s overbearing role, and 
Pakistan is caught between this vicious cycle of democracy, quasi-democracy, and military rule. 
The greatest damage inflicted to the self-image of the savior of Pakistan was Pakistan military’s 
defeat in Bangladesh at the hands of India, following widespread accusations of gross human 
rights violations and even genocide. The military’s explanation is that excesses were committed 
to save the federation from secession, and that it was India’s machinations and intervention that 
exploited Pakistan’s vulnerability in order to humiliate it. The Pakistani strategic elite had 
internalized the latter factor, and as an institution the military examined and learned lessons from 
its professional failures, but kept those lessons internal and classified. In their view, defeat was 
caused by bad luck or a unique situation, not a matter of overall incompetence.[10] Virtually no 
one was held responsible for the fiasco of Bangladesh or brought to justice[11]—and this has 
become a reference point in the blame-game and subsequent civil-military frictions in Pakistan. 
The Pakistani military does not concede superiority to the adversary, and with each subsequent 
episode and set back—such as Siachin in 1984 or Kargil in 1999—it resolves to live and fight 
another day. From a broader strategic cultural viewpoint, Pakistan refuses to acquiesce to Indian 
military might, and remains determined to find ways to equalize or balance. Preservation of 
national sovereignty is thus the primary objective, and in pursuance of national security all tools—
including the use of an asymmetric strategy—are justified. The military expects the nation to 
understand its difficulties rather than ridicule it as it faces an uphill battle. 
The meddling by Pakistan's military in domestic civil affairs emerges from its efforts to protect its 
professional integrity from interference and exploitation by the domestic political leadership. 
Pakistan's military has viewed civilian political leadership with disdain—as will be explained below. 
The military also feels threatened from being ridiculed or disrespected in the eyes of public. In a 
departure from this trend of ducking criticism, the Musharraf regime—especially since he restored 
controlled democracy in 2002—has allowed unprecedented media and press freedom. This has 
resulted in both healthy and unhealthy criticism. Desperate and disenchanted politicians mostly in 
opposition have found the new media freedom a platform to vent their anger against the military. 
And the military watches carefully from the sidelines. In cultural terms, it picks up criticism a la 
carte for reform and adjustments, but watches its interests and protects its way of life. 
Though Pakistan faces identity crises in a political sense, at the cultural level there is no issue as 
to the nature of its people and society. Pakistan is a Muslim country with a strong sense of “Islam” 
and its virtues. The ethos of its society remains moderate, conservative, and traditional. The 
Pakistani military and strategic elites are from the same stock. Since the birth of the Pakistani 
army there have been three sources of motivation: Regiment, Nation, and Faith. A soldier fights 
for his Nation (Pakistan) and upholds the pride of his Regiment (British tradition), and he 
sacrifices in the cause of Islam (in the name of God). A soldier’s sacrifice makes his regiment, his 
family, his clan or tribe, and his country proud, and above all he is a soldier of Islam who 
sacrifices in the name of God for a just cause. The Pakistani Army derives its strength and morale 
from all these sources, but most importantly its over-arching cause is the omnipresence of God in 
every facet of a Muslim life. When a soldier dies in the line of duty, he is revered for having 
embraced the highest form of death—Shahadat. 
In the mid 1970s, Zia-ul-Haq became the army chief. He institutionalized the role of Islam in the 
military. He gave the motto to the army “Iman (Faith), Taqwa (Piety) and Jihad (Struggle for Truth 
and Godliness).” The injunction of faith as a force-multiplier and the belief that superior training 
and faith will compensate against the otherwise larger and materially superior foe—India—was 
ingrained. During Zia-ul-Haq's tenure in the 1980s, the army ethos gradually evolved towards 
simplicity and a conservative lifestyle. Zia never dismantled the traditional structures of the 
military, or its organizational outlook and regimented style. 
He institutionalized rankwise privileges in the army and gave a clear template for professional 
development. And affecting not just the armed forces, Zia's vision shaped the social fabric of the 
entire society. Other developments in the region, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and 
the Islamic revolution in Iran, contributed to this evolution in Pakistani society and strategic 
culture. The influx of global aid, mercenaries, and Islamic warriors from all over the world, and 
their ultimate success against the Soviets, had a significant impact on the military culture in terms 
of the influence of Islam and virtues of asymmetric wars. 
By the late 1980s, Pakistani security thinking based meeting the challenge from India at three 
levels: asymmetric, conventional force response, and nuclear deterrent. It was not until the turn of 
the century that the realization came that support for ideological radicalism can boomerang. The 
attack by global terrorists based in Afghanistan on September 11, 2001 signaled the diminishing 
return and unintended consequences of encouraging ideological zealots. In a bold move, 
Pakistan reversed course after two decades to get back into the mainstream. This strategic 
reorientation is multi-dimensional: supporting the United States in its war against terror, 
rapprochement with India and Afghanistan, and focusing on economic revival and domestic 
issues. Pakistan's reorientation is a reflection of its powerful realist compulsions. Realism often 
trumps other factors, leading it to take bold initiatives—some that can backfire and others that can 
pull it out from deep troubles. 
Image of the Adversary 
Pakistan's insecurity is derived from three major factors: its geophysical and structural asymmetry 
with India; its lingering perceptions of India’s role in undermining Pakistan, and eroding its 
sovereignty and independence; and, finally, the intrinsic belief that Pakistan has been used by the 
United States and then abandoned when those interests were served. 
At the heart of Pakistan’s rivalry with India is its belief that the Hindus never truly accepted the 
presence of the Muslims in their midst. This perception is reinforced with every major act of 
communal violence that frequents India targeting minorities, mostly Muslims (such as the 
Ayodhya mosque destruction in 1991, and the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002). Communal 
rioting harkens back to the memory of the traumatic partition, and validates the two-nation theory. 
Pakistani grievances of treachery and conspiracy are grounded in more than simply the narrative 
and bitter experience of partition, but also in India’s overall aggressive behavior with all of its 
neighbors. Kashmir has several dimensions relating to the Pakistani polity. Besides the historical 
and ideological affinity of geographically contiguous Muslims, Pakistani strategic compulsions are 
tied to the region. All major rivers flow from Kashmir into Pakistan, and India has demonstrated it 
is willing to strangle Pakistan’s lifeline. As well, Pakistan has found alienated Kashmir suffering 
under forced occupation, and Pakistan's objective is to deny India’s forceful attempt to pocket 
Kashmir. Pakistan has supported the Kashmir insurgency, and facilitated and encouraged 
volunteers to fight an asymmetric struggle in Kashmir. For fifteen years now this insurgency has 
tied down Indian forces that would otherwise either crush with impunity the Kashmiri Muslims or 
menace Pakistan’s eastern frontiers. Since September 11th, this insurgency is looked upon as 
terrorism by India, but as the continuity of a freedom struggle or insurgency by Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s external and internal threats often interacted in ways that were disastrous to Pakistani 
security. Internally, Pakistan faced serious ethnic divisions and questions about the proper role of 
religion in the public sphere. Externally, Pakistan faced threats on its northwest border with 
Afghanistan, and at points the Soviet Union, as well. Though this was less dangerous than the 
eastern threat, the problem on the northwest border included the sponsoring of Pashtun militants 
by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Most critical to Pakistani security was the India problem. 
This security challenge was exacerbated as Pakistan attempted to secure two wings separated 
by a hostile India. And the Pakistani nightmare manifested itself in the 1971 war, when India 
successfully severed Pakistan’s eastern wing, and played midwife to the new state of Bangladesh. 
During the long political crisis that preceded the 1971 war, Indian analyst K. Subrahmanyam 
noted that the situation provided India with “an opportunity the like of which will never come 
again.”[12] 
Subsequent events reinforced Pakistani suspicions that India will seize any available opportunity 
to erode Pakistan’s position. Traumatized by the loss of its eastern half, Pakistan—under 
duress—signed the Simla Agreement in 1972. But for Pakistan, the Indian security threat did not 
end with Simla. India continued a forward-leaning policy along the Line of Control in Kashmir, 
most visibly evident in the operation to seize the Siachin glacier in 1984. At several points in the 
1980s, Pakistan also received what it viewed as credible intelligence that India was planning for a 
preventive strike against Pakistan’s centrifuge plant at Kahuta. In 1987, India’s large-scale 
Operation Brasstacks caused real concern in Islamabad about India’s possible hostile intent, 
especially since Pakistan was occupied with the Soviet threat in Afghanistan. 
From their experiences in the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistani decision-makers were increasingly 
convinced that if India was presented with an opportunity, it would weaken Pakistan. When the 
Kashmir uprising came about in 1989 and 1990, it surprised Pakistani policymakers. The Kashmir 
dispute would once again take center-stage in the India-Pakistan relationship, a position that it 
continues to hold even today. The unresolved Kashmir question was at the center of Indo-
Pakistani discord throughout the 1990s and until today. 
For decades, Kabul asserted a revisionist claim on Pakistan’s western border as Pakistan was 
struggling in a fight for survival against India. Afghanistan’s strategic networking with India and 
the Soviet Union created problems in the two volatile western provinces of Pakistan. This posed a 
two-front challenge for Pakistan that bedeviled its relations with Afghanistan. In the 1990s, 
Pakistan continued its forward policy in Afghanistan—even when the United States abandoned 
Pakistan. Pakistan, though left alone, was still determined to continue with the success begun 
with the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. Its support of the Taliban was derived from its sense of 
abandonment and its fear of victimization for its role of supporting the United States during the 
Cold War. It sole purpose was to prevent forces inimical to Pakistan from taking power, and to 
open routes for energy and economic access to Central Asia. This policy boomeranged, and its 
consequence was immense, as manifested on September 11, 2001. 
Pakistan has thus resorted to a range of strategies, which are a mix of realism and strategic 
culture. To balance against its geophysical and conventional force disadvantages, it has sought 
an alliance with the United States and China in the hope of bridging the gap, and redressing this 
fundamental insecurity. And it has relied upon asymmetric strategies and conventional force 
deterrence to make aggression costly and/or deny strategic space to its principal adversary, India.  
But Pakistan is unwilling to accept perceived injustices, unwilling to acquiesce to Indian 
hegemony, and resolved to compete rather than recognize an unfavorable state of imbalance.[13] 
It has suffered losses and reputation costs, but is beholden to the dynamics of threats and 
response. Under a rational assumption, the logical course for Pakistan would be to come to terms 
with the status quo power of India. But Pakistan is psychologically unwilling to accept India's 
superiority and political dominance. It can accept primacy—but not hegemony. Strategic culture 
demands a “never say die" attitude of acceptance of strategic defeat—and subservience remains 
a non-option. 
Strategic Choices 
Strategic culture plays an important role in determining state behavior and responses to emerging 
threats and policy courses. When weak states confront stronger states within a regional construct, 
they have two fundamental options: bandwagon with the emerging power, or seek to balance 
against a perceived threat. Both are rational options but each course has a price to pay. When 
states exercise the first option, they accept the dominance of the stronger state and reconcile that 
their continued safety relies on the will of the stronger state. Necessarily, such bandwagoning 
requires an intense sacrifice by the weaker state and a coming-to-terms with this status-quo. 
India believes it is the status quo power, but Pakistan is neither willing to sacrifice its sovereignty, 
nor ready to accept the terms of the status quo. Islamabad can sense the rise of India, but feels 
that a policy of acquiescence will put it on a slippery slope and refuses a slow evolution into a 
“West Bangladesh.” 
The second option for Pakistan is to seek balance against the security threat, which is more 
closely aligned to its strategic culture, and in conformity with the history of Pakistani reaction and 
response to external threats. A balancing course might include a mix of several strategies: the 
involvement of international institutions, the pursuit of alliances, and/or the development of 
internal military capabilities. Pakistan has pursued all of these potential options in its desire to 
balance against growing Indian power. Given these multiple challenges and three-dimensional 
threats, and driven out of fear and concerns over its ultimate survival, Pakistan’s case is 
analogous to another state: Israel. Stephen Cohen summed up the Pakistani situation, and has 
argued: 
Like Israel, Pakistan was founded by a people who felt persecuted when living as a minority, and 
even though they possess their own states (which are based on religious identity), both remain 
under threat from powerful enemies. In both cases, an original partition demonstrated the hostility 
of neighbors, and subsequent wars showed that these neighbors remained hostile. Pakistan and 
Israel have also followed parallel strategic policies. Both sought an entangling alliance with 
various outside powers (at various times Britain, France, China, and the United States), both 
ultimately concluded that outsiders could not be trusted in a moment of extreme crisis, and this 
led them to develop nuclear weapons.[14] 
Strategic Culture and External Alliance: China and the United States 
Despite uncertainties about its allies, Pakistani security policy has been shaped by strategic 
partnerships with the United States and China. The onset of the Cold War provided Pakistan an 
opportunity to seek a formal alliance with the United States. But it was soon apparent that there 
existed only a marginal overlap between United States and Pakistani security interests. U.S. 
security guarantees, so enticing to Pakistan, were found to have no utility when Pakistan faced 
Indian forces in 1965 and 1971. Pakistan drifted from the “most allied ally” in the 1950s and 
1980s to the most sanctioned ally in the 1990s, to the “most suspected ally” from 2001 onwards. 
Dennis Kux in his appropriately titled book, U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Disenchanted Allies  records 
how relations between two differently focused countries developed over decades. Each episode 
ended with disappointment, leaving a gap between expectations and delivery. At one time in the 
1950s and 60s, Pakistan trusted its security to its alliance with the United States. The Pakistani 
strategic enclave began to believe in its own self-deception about the nature of the alliance, and 
the degree of U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s security concerns regarding India and Afghanistan. 
But generally after 1965—and most certainly after 1971—Pakistani strategic thinking concluded 
that Pakistan’s survival could not be guaranteed by an outside power. 
Pakistan’s shifted its policy towards the Middle East and China during the 1970s, and 
commenced its nuclear program—which brought further alienation and friction with the United 
States. Though China also did not provide substantial support during periods of intense crisis, it 
has provided Pakistan with military, technological, and diplomatic support for several decades. In 
the early 1960s, Pakistan was formally in alliance with the United States, but immediately after 
India’s defeat in the 1962 India-China border war, in a shrewd Machiavellian move, Pakistan 
extended a hand to China. 
Much to the chagrin of India and the dislike of the United States, Pakistan settled its border 
issues with China, ceding territory to China, and establishing a long-term relationship that has 
lasted to date. Realism brought Pakistan a strategic partner in China, and in the decades ahead 
helped Pakistan—especially during the period of U.S. abandonment. While China, like the United 
States, valued aspects of its relationship with Pakistan, Beijing did not necessarily agree with all 
of Islamabad’s security concerns and threat perceptions. 
So why is China seen as a more reliable partner? China and Pakistan have memories of 
supporting the other during moments of international isolation. The Pakistani narrative recalls that 
China came to Pakistan’s help, if not rescue, in times of dire need and international isolation. 
China helped Pakistan even under pressure from the United States, and also suffered sanctions 
for Pakistan’s sake (such as U.S. sanctions against China in the early 1990s). In turn, Chinese 
strategic leaders almost always recall—and remind Pakistani leaders of—their appreciation of the 
risks Pakistan took when it gave unstinted support to an otherwise lonely China in the 1960s. 
Pakistan faced the wrath and annoyance of the U.S. administration during the Johnson period. 
Later it was Pakistan that facilitated the Nixon-Kissinger initiative in 1971 that revolutionized 
China’s relationship with the world.[15] The Pakistani strategic community believes, especially 
within the military-scientific community, that there is this common “Islamic–Confucian” cultural 
value of not abandoning friends—an experience which contrasts sharply with the Pakistani 
experience of its western alliance, especially with the United States in critical times for Pakistan 
(1965, 1971, 1990 and 1999).[16] The continued sustenance of a “Sino-Pakistani entente 
cordiale”[17] can be explained as the result of both realist compulsions and strategic cultural 
inclinations. 
As a smaller partner in its alliances, and a weaker protagonist in its rivalry with India, Pakistan’s 
ambition exceeded its capacity. Pakistan repeatedly miscalculated in challenging and confronting 
a much stronger India. There existed a gap between Pakistani strategic expectations and the 
actual delivery from Pakistan’s allies. The most enigmatic aspect of Pakistan’s regional security 
policy has been Pakistani decisions to undertake adventures alone, even when there's no 
realistic hope of support by allies. Pakistani strategic policy in 1948, 1965, 1971, the 1990s 
(Kashmir and the Taliban), and 1999 (Kargil) exemplifies this pattern. This aspect of Pakistani 
policy defies the logic of realism, but can be explained as the result of strategic compulsions, 
organizational dynamics, or strategic culture—or a combination of all. Even though Pakistan's 
experience with allies has been disappointing, together, these political relationships have 
prevented India-centric positions on the Kashmir issue in international forums, and these military 
relationships have provided Pakistan with much needed equipment and technology in its race to 
maintain a conventional and nuclear deterrent against India. 
Strategic Culture and the Nuclear Factor 
Failing to find support from allies and international institutions, Pakistan determined that only by 
matching India’s conventional and nuclear development could its security be ensured. Pakistan's 
quest for nuclear weapons began in 1972 after its defeat in the Bangladesh War. But India’s 1974 
“peaceful nuclear experiment” jostled Pakistan out of its nuclear complacency. Coming so close 
after its defeat in East Pakistan and reeling under domestic pressures, Pakistan had a severe 
shock. 
There were two sets of responses in Pakistan. First, there was a firm belief that only nuclear 
response could neutralize a nuclear threat. Pakistan never countenanced seeking a poor man’s 
equalizer through chemical and/or biological options. Second, nuclear weapons were seen as a 
force multiplier to deter aggression by conventional force. As nuclear capability developed, it 
compensated for Pakistan’s limited resources and its strategic asymmetry with India. Nuclear 
weapons are critical to Pakistan and an assurance for national survival. There is no constituency 
in Pakistan that believes otherwise. 
The nuclear weapons factor might best explain cohesive Pakistani strategic culture perceptions: 
Pakistan firmly believes that for every proliferation act committed by India, Pakistan was (and 
would be) punished. Pakistan faced three major challenges in its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent, 
and takes great pride in being able to overcome all three. The first political-technical challenge for 
Pakistan was to develop a nuclear weapon despite the global nonproliferation regime. The 
second challenge for Pakistan was to acquire and/or develop a means of delivery, again jumping 
over the hurdle of sanctions—and in particular the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
Third, Pakistan needed to validate its delivery means and its weapons designs through testing. 
Facing multiple layers of sanctions because of its nuclear weapons and missile programs, 
Pakistan could have only conducted tests if India obliged—and India did oblige. 
By the end of the century, the story of defiance and ingenuity through which Pakistan acquired its 
nuclear weapons capability had been passed on to three generations. The Pakistani public 
eulogized every innovative method applied by A. Q. Khan to acquire Pakistan's nuclear capability, 
and this norm-defiance was indeed a cultural trait, one that is so hard for the West to comprehend. 
When the A. Q. Khan saga unfolded, the Pakistani nation saw a hero in A Q Khan—and the 
consequences of black market activity was not a matter of concern but rather a symbol of 
defiance of the West. 
But only when A. Q. Khan resisted efforts to come under authority did he become a source of 
concern, and was sacked. When his proliferation network took a life of its own, and was exposed, 
there was no choice but to take action. But the immediate political reaction in Pakistan was to 
search for a conspiracy, and then to accept the official explanation. Pakistani strategic culture will 
admit there were mistakes committed in the process of its acquiring nuclear capability, but the 
belief extends that in the quest to get its nuclear capability at all costs, such mistakes were 
unavoidable. 
Acquiring nuclear weapons did not imply that deterrence was automatic. Pakistan faced 
challenges of other sorts. The lessons of modern strategy are equally applicable in the region as 
well. Pakistan’s fundamental security policy is to deter India from aggression, and therefore 
Pakistan must deny strategic space and raise the cost should India contemplate conventional 
force attacks. And India has avowed to create such strategic space, occupy it, and “punish” 
Pakistan through coercive military policies and the use of force. 
This strategic construct has escalatory potential. Pakistan is compelled to match all levels of 
escalation and put the onus of escalation and risk on India to take the conflict to the next level. 
The risk in this game of chicken is high, and unacceptable when nuclear weapons are in the 
backdrop. Precisely because Pakistan denies India’s ability of escalation control, it has been able 
to deter conventional conflict with India. Pakistan’s major strategic centers are perilously close to 
the Indian border, and Pakistan must respond quickly if it is to ensure that these key centers of 
gravity are protected. This explains Pakistan’s rejection of no-first-use which is “a natural refusal 
to lighten or simplify a stronger adversary’s assessment of risk; it implies the retention of an 
option, not a positive policy of first use as a preferred course.”[18] It is precisely for this reason 
that Pakistan has neither explained the red lines nor articulated a public nuclear doctrine. As U.S. 
President Dwight Eisenhower said to his vice president, Richard Nixon, in 1958, “You should 
never let the enemy know what you will not do.”[19] 
The use of nuclear weapons as a war-fighting tool is not a contemplated doctrine in Pakistani 
strategic thinking; however the command system believes that the integration of nuclear and 
conventional forces is necessary to create a credible deterrent. This does not necessarily mean 
that Pakistan is considering elaborate nuclear war-fighting scenarios. Instead, Pakistan’s 
command system at the highest level should know what both the “conventional hand” and the 
“nuclear hand” are doing. Pakistan’s civil and military leadership operates jointly at the Joint 
Services level under a unified military command system. 
Conclusions  
In a mix of realism and strategic culture, Pakistan's behavior is predictable in many ways. It will 
not seek parity with India but will do its utmost to balance and retain initiative; it will seek external 
alliances with outside powers (the United States or China), but will not sacrifice its regional 
objectives. Pakistan will be cognizant of “emerging India“ in partnership with the United States, 
but will never assume that this rise will be benign. The most rational path that might be suggested 
for Pakistan is to accept this reality, give up its claims, and bandwagon with emerging India. But 
realism and strategic culture will predict that Pakistan will never accept hegemony. Strategic 
culture will explain that the Pakistanis will work night and day to develop responses and 
countervailing strategies to ensure that India has a high cost to pay for any adventure. This was 
ingrained in Pakistan's military since the very onset of Pakistan when its founder Jinnah stated:  
Pakistan has been created and its security and defense is now your responsibility. I want them to 
be the best soldiers in the world, so that no one can cast an evil eye on Pakistan, and if he does 
we shall fight him to the end until either he throws us into Arabian Sea or we drown in the Indian 
Ocean.[20]  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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